Ryan Finnigan received his doctorate from Duke University in
2013, and is an Associate Professor in the Sociology Department
at UC Davis. His research focuses on structural changes in
metropolitan housing and labor markets, and their implications
for racial/ethnic inequalities in work and homeownership.
Across the United States, the health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are much greater for already disadvantaged people. The health and economic burdens faced by people experiencing homelessness make them especially vulnerable.[1] This vulnerability has been heightened further by the widespread curtailing of crucial services for people experiencing homelessness following COVID-19 outbreaks at temporary shelters.
While the spread of the novel coronavirus is affecting different regions and populations to different extents, one thing is clear: people experiencing homelessness are especially susceptible to both the virus and the disease it can cause (COVID-19). This is due in part to the high concentration of people experiencing homelessness in urban and coastal regions with high infection rates. It is also true that, compared to the general population, people experiencing homelessness suffer from more health conditions and are less able to access health care.
Housing and utility costs consume the majority of monthly incomes for millions of individuals and families in the United States. Missed payments can result in penalties, utility shutoffs, and evictions. Between 14 and 16 percent of the U.S.
No group is as linked to poverty in the American mind as single
mothers. For decades, politicians, journalists and scholars have
scrutinized the reasons poor couples fail to use contraception,
have children out of wedlock and do not marry.
The reality, however, is that single motherhood is not the reason
we have unusually high poverty in the United States, compared
with other rich democracies.
When measured relative to median income, poverty in the United
States, at 16.3 percent, is much higher than in many
industrialized, democratic countries. To explain this, scholars,
politicians, and the public often focus on the risks of poverty.
Risks are characteristics more common among the poor than the
non-poor, like low education, unemployment, single motherhood, or
young age of the head of household. In a study I conducted with
David Brady and Sabine Huebgen, we found that the cause of
relatively high poverty in the U.S.
Jobs that offer hours that vary from week to week present
significant challenges for low-wage workers. In a new study[1] we
find that the number of workers with inconsistent work hours
increased significantly throughout the Great Recession and
recovery. These workers had lower incomes and higher poverty
rates than those with steady hours. However, the increase in
inconsistent hours was smaller among union members and in states
with higher-than-average unionization. This suggests unionization
could improve the chances a worker will have the steady income
needed to plan for even short-term basic needs.
It can be hard to plan for basic needs, like paying rent or
taking care of your kids, if you don’t know when you’ll be
working next week or just how many hours you will be needed.
A new study by researchers at the University of California,
Davis, finds that an unpredictable work week is the norm for
growing numbers of low-wage workers — nearly 40 percent of whom
worked variable hours for at least one four-month period after
the start of the 2007-2009 Great Recession.
What a job looks like has changed for many people since the
recession. In general, things are looking up: Both
unemployment and jobless claims are falling. But a good
chunk of job creation has come
at the highest and lowest ends of the
spectrum, a trend that has only recently started to
change with gains for middle-wage earners. Many people who lost
well-paying jobs have found work, but for less money, doing
hourly retail and food services jobs.
Millions of workers experienced increased variability in the
regularity and predictability of their working hours in the Great
Recession. This volatility brings negative consequences for their
economic security and family lives, which can be as profound as
job loss. The growth of work variability was facilitated by the
decline of labor market institutions protecting workers from such
volatility, particularly the profound decline of labor unions.
